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In a currently highly competitive international environment, US goals of consolidating and 
strengthening NATO as well as bringing its present mission in Afghanistan to successful 
termination gain in significance. The success of these processes enhances the reputation 
of the United States as a powerful international actor. I checked the hypothesis that facing 
sharp critique from the United States president for free riding in NATO, those members who 
fail to meet the target of 2 per cent of GDP in their defense expenditure would choose to 
increase significantly their contributions to the Alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan. I did not find 
enough convincing empirical data to prove it. The contributions of allies rather reflect their 
power potentials and ambitions they pursue by cooperating in NATO framework. US allies 
remain able to define the scale of their contribution to collective efforts in NATO framework 
despite the US pressure. Broadening of the Alliance’s purview after the end of the Cold war 
provided member states with additional alternatives for choosing types of their involvement. 
My findings generally support the established view on intra-alliance bargaining process in 
scholarly literature. A wide range of missions in NATO framework and beyond it facilitates 
coalition formation for the United States with their numerous allies and partners. At the same 
time, if more major allies further choose to cooperate with Washington outside NATO, it will 
undermine its effectiveness and global role. 
Keywords: NATO, United States, Afghanistan, alliance, politics of prestige, new Europe, old 
Europe.
As Donald Trump finishes his second year as the President of United States of Amer-
ica, journalists, researches and political analysts around the world widely speculate on 
the impact his presidency would make on the international system and the US role in the 
world. Transatlantic relations are also an important issue-area which attracts attention of 
numerous observers, and which is influenced by Trump’s characteristic way of dealing 
with NATO allies. Though in many respects he tends to continue the policy of previous 
administration rather than bring about any revolutionary changes, he does that in arro-
gant and blatant manner by exerting pressure on his counterparts, at least by employing 
tough political rhetoric. 
In the run-up to presidential elections, Donald Trump campaigned on the issue of 
fair burden sharing in NATO in his attempts to attract voters who felt forgotten and left 
behind by political elites, who seemed to be too preoccupied with problems of globalized 
world. After taking office he did not give up completely his populist rhetoric, kept criticiz-
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 1 41
ing US allies for free-riding in the North Atlantic alliance while the United States did the 
most part, and calling on them to fulfill their commitments. Newly elected president at-
tached much significance to the informal obligations that all NATO members took on by 
signing the joint declaration after the summit in Wales in 2014 where they expressed the 
intention to spend no less than 2 per cent of GDP on defense by 2024. Though the allies 
had a decade to fulfill their promise, Trump mounted pressure on those states who still did 
not attain the goal, publicly shaming them almost on every occasion.
Never absent from NATO’s agenda the issue of burden-sharing became even more sa-
lient after the end of the Cold war, when the US allies who enjoyed the peace dividend, de-
creased their defense budgets. As viewed from Washington’s perspective, this move could 
compromise NATO’s international role as effective military alliance. Persistent capabilities 
gap between the United States and its NATO allies could also become a significant obsta-
cle to success in overseas missions. 
Back in 2014, just three member states (United States, Greece, United Kingdom), 
spent 2 percent or more on defense. According to NATO estimates, in 2018 this number 
will increase to five (US, Greece, Estonia, United Kingdom, Latvia) with additional three 
states (Poland, Lithuania, and Romania) approaching this benchmark [1]. Despite their 
pledges and Trump’s pressure, there are still some states like Spain and Hungary who are 
not likely to meet the target by 2024. A group of countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, etc.) cannot boast sharp increase in defense expenditure as 
well [2].
In August 2017, Donald Trump outlined a new strategy of US engagement in Afghan-
istan that required, inter alia, modest increase1 in presence of military personnel from the 
allied states to train, advice and assist Afghan troops, already deployed in the country as a 
part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission (RSM) that the Alliance had launched in Janu-
ary 2015. For those NATO allies criticized by Trump as ‘free riders’ for failing to augment 
sharply defense expenditures, sending additional personnel to Afghanistan was an oppor-
tunity to display resolve and solidarity, loyalty and commitment to the Alliance’s goals and 
even to some extent to decrease the diplomatic pressure from Washington. 
In fact, those US allies who made large contributions to the mission in Afghanistan 
(Italy, Turkey, etc.) wanted their efforts to be considered in discussion of burden sharing in 
NATO, using this fact in inter-alliance bargaining process. Participating in important mis-
sions endorsed by Washington could further strengthen their reputations of ‘loyal allies’ 
and dispel some criticism for ‘free riding’ at least for their national audiences. However, 
James Mattis Trump’s Secretary of Defense (2017–2019) clearly indicated that the US pre-
ferred no linkage between these issues, reportedly stating “troop contributions to missions 
did not exempt them from broader spending goals” [2]. It is also worth noticing, that par-
ticipation in NATO’s Resolute Support mission was not the only option for them to display 
loyalty. In fact, they could choose from a broad set of operation in NATO framework and 
beyond it, i. e. Baltic air policing operation, patrolling South China Sea, counter-terrorism 
missions in Syria and Iraq, etc. Even those states who seem committed to stabilization of 
Afghanistan could opt whether to deploy additional personnel or allocate more money 
for Trust funds, one of which — Afghan National Army Trust Fund — is operated by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
1 In comparison to the ‘surge’ earlier commanded by the Obama administration. 
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In this paper, I check the hypothesis that those states who by that time spent on 
defense less than was pledged in NATO’s Wales summit declaration, would use Donald 
Trump’s call to augment personnel in Afghanistan in order to restore their reputations of 
‘loyal allies’.
I analyze contributions to the RSM by US NATO allies made before December 2018, 
when Donald Trump announce pullout of the US troops from Syria and his Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis resigned. Following this announced, there appeared many specula-
tions in US media about the possible withdrawal of a half of the US troops from Afghani-
stan, though this decision was never publicly announced. This move, if it is done, could 
become a ‘game changer’ for those allies who earlier planned to send more personnel to 
Afghanistan. 
I also introduce to analysis of NATO’s present day activity the concept of the “poli-
cy of prestige” derived from Hans Morgenthau’s seminal work “Politics among Nations: 
Struggle for Power and Peace”. I argue that it provides better understanding of the signifi-
cance of the Alliance’s initiatives and activity. 
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan presents an interesting case for consideration, 
since this large-scale out-of-area mission was regarded as a test of the Alliance’s ability 
to act globally and to carry post-Cold war tasks. In a popular move to support the fight 
against terrorism, NATO assumed command over the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) established in 2001 under the UN Security Council Resolution 1386, whose 
goal was “to enable the Afghan Government provide effective security across the country 
and develop new Afghan security forces” [3]. However, for member states, this mission 
turned to be almost endless, bringing controversial results and requiring more and more 
human and financial resources over time [4, p. 109]. By the end of 2014, the ISAF passed 
its responsibility for stability in the country to Afghanistan security forces. NATO’s com-
bat expedition was over. However, starting on January 1, 2015, the Alliance took on a 
new Resolute Support mission to train, advice and assist the Afghan National Defense 
and Security Forces (ANDSF), amid the growing pessimism about its outcomes. The suc-
cess (or failure) of the mission is likely to influence considerably the reputation of NATO 
as an organization with global outreach and capable for provision of security in remote 
regions. 
1. Theoretical Framework
I analyze the decisions taken by NATO as resulting from broad bargaining process 
inside the Alliance when all states exercise their relative power to influence outcome. John 
R. Deni succinctly and clearly describes state’s bargaining power as a situation “when it has 
a higher chance of obtaining its preferred outcome” [5, p. 13]. Well aware of asymmetrical 
relationship in the sphere of security between the United States and its allies, we have to 
expect that Washington will be able to provide for cooperative behavior of his partners. 
The likelihood of favorable to the United States outcome will increase with a growing per-
ception of threat to security and interests of all parties. 
However, the neorealist literature on alliance politics gives more nuanced picture, 
suggesting that such factors as state’s dependence on alliance, its strategic interest in main-
taining it, the clarity of one’s commitments as well as the resolve of adversaries can influ-
ence bargaining power and its choices to cooperate or to abstain from cooperation [6, 
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p. 472–474]. Patricia Weitsman claims that there is also a need to differentiate between 
wartime and peacetime alliance [7, p. 31]. 
US economist Mancur Olsen introduced the collective action problem to the research 
on alliances [8], stressing the point that weaker allies whose contributions are rather in-
significant have more opportunities (and incentives) to neglect their commitments. Todd 
Sandler and Keith Hartley proposed two models of collective action in international coali-
tions: pure public good model and joint product model [9, p. 872, 876]. 
Wallace J. Thies conducted a detailed empirical research on different issues in rela-
tionship between NATO allies. He concluded that member states certainly preferred to 
provide for security collectively. However, he portrayed them as “burden shifters intent on 
transferring to their allies responsibility for the collective effort” [10, p. XIV], “simultane-
ously hoping that their share of the collective burden can be made as small as possible” 
[10, p. XIV]. 
Some researchers employ the logic of two-level games to explain the outcome of bar-
gaining process, demonstrating that allied support of certain initiatives depends on issue 
area, where domestic factors tend to be more or less important [11, p. 318–319]. In this 
vein, based on analysis of foreign policy of UK, Canada and Australia in the US war on 
terror Stefanie von Hlatky concludes that the ability to contribute to Washington’s military 
operations depends on availability of material resources and one’s political prowess in 
forging the domestic coalition in support of the mission [12, p. 19–20]. After working with 
extensive public opinion polls data, Sarah Kreps claimed that a prolonged NATO’s activ-
ity in Afghanistan was possible because of the consensus of transatlantic political elites at 
the time when public in most countries supported immediate withdrawal of troops [13, 
p. 191]. 
Recently, the problem of caveats, i. e. allies’ imposition of limitations on the use of 
their troops, attracted attention of scholars [14, p. 67; 15, p. 4–5]. 
Researchers of neoliberal tradition in their works on alliances tend to highlight the 
influence of political regime of member states on their relationship. One of the most sig-
nificant examples of this approach is a monograph by Thomas Risse-Kappen “Coopera-
tion among Democracies: The European Influence on U. S. Foreign Policy”. He finds insuf-
ficient the explanations of European influence on American foreign policy provided by 
“traditional alliance theories emphasizing strategic interaction and power-based bargain-
ing”. He views the transatlantic alliance as “a community of liberal democracies”, whose 
collective identity shared by the United States as well, has a strong impact on practices the 
states employ in their interactions. Based on several case studies he concludes that there 
are three main mechanisms that the European allies use to influence US policies: 1) timely 
consultation; 2) exposing domestic pressures; 3) transnational and transgovernmental co-
alitions among societal and bureaucratic actors [16, p. 4–5]. 
Thus, a brief review of scholarly literature on inter-alliance bargaining suggests that 
even in highly asymmetrical relationship there sometimes are several opportunities for 
relatively weaker states to promote their interests in alliance or at least to refrain from 
participation in highly unpopular activity. 
In this article I analyze the relationship in NATO during the presidency of Donald 
Trump in the United States with a special consideration given to the Alliance’s efforts in 
Afghanistan. I argue that the concept of “politics of prestige” as described by Hans Mor-
genthau is useful for deeper understanding of intra-alliance politics of this period. 
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Often a neglected issue in the study of international relations, policy of prestige is 
“as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the 
relations between individuals” [17, p. 86–87]. Prestige for states understood as “reputation 
for performance and power” [17, p. 95] is even more important than it is for individuals 
who strive for it out of desire for self-recognition. A reputation of state helps it to achieve 
its foreign policy goals without resorting to military power or other expensive means of 
statecraft. Moreover, “it is hoped that the prestige of one’s own nation will be great enough 
to deter the other nations from going to war” [17, p. 93]. States pursue policy of prestige in 
support of a certain policy or for its own sake. 
The necessity to maintain NATO’s reputation as effective military alliance capable to 
attain its policy goals and ensure the security of its members explains the insistence of the 
United States that its allies spend two percent of GDP or more on defense. A benchmark 
of two percent for defense expenditure for allied states was the result of compromise in 
NATO. In reality, the fact that state’s military spending reaches two percent of GDP does 
not guarantee its defense capacity. There are great differences in amount of GDP among 
NATO members. It comes as no surprise that wealthier states with larger GDP have more 
difficulties in raising defense expenditure to meet the target set in the Wales declaration 
of 2014 since they have to reallocate larger sums of money. Moreover, GDP indicators are 
subject to annual fluctuations. Thus, when GDP decreases a state can boast larger per-
centage spent on defense. The efficiency of spending leaves doubts, too, even though the 
states, who signed the Wales summit declaration, committed themselves to spend more 
than 20 % of their defense budgets “on major equipment, including related Research and 
Development” [18]. According to NATO estimates, 16 out of 29 member states will meet 
this requirement in 2018, and most of those countries made an impressive progress since 
2014 [1]. 
Meeting the goals of the Wales Summit Declaration symbolizes one’s resolve to sacri-
fice resources for its own security and the Alliance’s common cause. Maintaining NATO’s 
reputation as a viable military alliance gains in significance when its relevance and capac-
ity is increasingly questioned inside the Alliance [19; 20; 21, p. 360; 22] as well as outside. 
For example Aleksandr Khramchikhin, the leading Russian military analyst, claims that 
the European states have passed the point of no return and now, no matter if they reach 
a benchmark of the Wales declaration or not, they will lack resolve to fight an adversary 
with commensurate military power [23]. 
Without considering at length the readiness and overall performance of NATO states 
troops, in this article I rather work with statistical indicators about each of them, which 
are available on the North Atlantic Alliance’s website. Whether a state meets the Wales 
Declaration target or not and how impressive is its progress  — all these facts are very 
important during Donald Trump presidency for purely reputational reasons, especially 
given the significance that the US President himself attaches to these facts in his public 
speeches and Twits. 
As for the role of the conflict in Afghanistan, it gains even more importance for the 
Alliance’s reputation for eradication of terrorism and stabilization, as this Central Asian 
country increasingly turns into a playground for great powers competing for influence. 
Donald Trump employs a technique of ‘shaming’ the US allies by criticizing in offi-
cial statements and in his Twits their failure to spend a necessary amount on defense and 
contribute a fair share to the collective efforts. This political rhetoric technique aims at 
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increasing the US bargaining power and mounting more pressure on NATO allies by por-
traying them as free riders. The publicity of this issue by itself suggests that it is used as a 
clout on allies. At the same time, in order to decrease this pressure and limit US bargaining 
power other member states are likely to use defensive rhetoric highlighting their contribu-
tions and achievements. By enhancing their role in Afghanistan, at least symbolically, US 
allies can increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, I hypothesize 
that those NATO states that did not reach the benchmark on defense expenditure will 
enhance their military role in Afghanistan by increasing the number of troops stationed 
there.
I view cooperative behavior in NATO framework as a manifestation of willingness to 
invest resources — human and financial — in maintenance of multilateral organization 
with a solid base of historically developed institutions with a prominence of the United 
States. This singles out the North Atlantic Alliance from other forms of bilateral and mul-
tilateral cooperation with the US often referred to as ‘ad hoc coalitions’, ‘coalitions of the 
willing’, etc. 
2. Present Challenges in Afghanistan 
By the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States, NATO was en-
gaged in three main kinds of activity in Afghanistan: 
1) Resolute Support Mission (RSM) started in January 2015; it focused “primarily 
on training, advice and assistance activities at the security-related ministries, in 
the country’s institutions and among the senior ranks of the army and police” 
[24]. The number of its participants amounted to 39, including the member states 
and operational partners. According to information on the organization’s official 
website it performs “supporting functions” in such areas as operational planning, 
budgetary development, force generation process, management and development 
of personnel; logistical sustainment; and civilian oversight over Afghan national 
defense and security forces and institutions [24]. As in February 2017, the total 
number of troops from member states and operational partners participating in 
RSM was 13,459 [24]. 
2) NATO ran Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund created in 2007. It was one 
of the “four funding streams to channel financial support to Afghanistan security 
forces and institutions” [24]. Initially the mission of the Fund was to support 
“transportation and installation of donated equipment, to purchase equipment 
and services for ANA engineering projects, and to support in and out-of-country 
training” [24], later its scope expanded to include support for literacy, professional 
training and capacity building, development of good governance, enhancement 
of participation of women [25]. Recently, NATO and its operational partners 
decided to extend financial sustainment of the Afghan army through 2024. By 
July 2016, 31 states — NATO members and the Alliance’s partners — collectively 
contributed 1,555,635,000 dollars [25]. 
3) In 2010 NATO and Afghanistan signed a Declaration on Enduring Partnership, 
since then they develop cooperation in such areas as capacity building, professional 
military education, civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, public 
46 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 1
diplomacy efforts to provide for better understanding of NATO policy by Afghani 
public.
Russian former diplomat and lead researcher at MGIMO Centre for East Asian and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies Mikhail Konarovsky in his assessment of situ-
ation in Afghanistan after 2014 — the year of major withdrawal of US troops — notes with 
confidence that the country avoided development of the worst-case scenario envisioned 
by expert community at those times [26, p. 250]. That kind of scenario implied decreasing 
control of central authorities, “the de facto geographic and political defragmentation of 
the country, a slide towards chaos and ‘war of all against all’ and ultimately the Taliban’s 
(forbidden in Russia) total control over the country” [26, p. 250]. 
However, the situation on the ground was hardly optimistic. The United States were 
involved in the longest military conflict in their history that had reached a stalemate. 
In September, 2017, Bill Roggio and Alexandra Gutowski based on combined anal-
ysis of data provided by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR), the US oversight body, recent media publications and information from Tali-
ban (forbidden in Russia), concluded that at that time the Taliban (forbidden in Russia) 
controlled 41 and contested 118 districts (about 45 per cent of all country’s districts) [27]. 
In 2017, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded a nine per-
cent decrease in civilian casualties compared to the year 2016, which became the first 
year-on-year decrease since 2012. However, there were documented 10 453 civilian casu-
alties (3438 deaths and 7015 injured) [28]. The security situation in the country remained 
volatile. The rise of ISIL-KP (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant — Khorasan province, 
forbidden in Russia), whose significant presence in the eastern region of the country is 
still recorded by UNAMA [29], is the source of regional concern that attracts attention of 
other powers, like Russia and China to the situation in the country. 
Lack of the unity in national government, high level of corruption and state’s inability 
to sustain itself financially without foreign aid further aggravate situation [30, p. 111–113]. 
In present conditions when the prospects for agreement with the Taliban (forbidden 
in Russia) on terms favorable to Afghanistan national government remain elusive further 
decrease in US military presence in the country would have negative impact on regional 
security. Washington can hardly achieve it without considerable reputational losses. The 
implication of pulling out troops too early, as in the case of Iraq, can be a tremendous rise 
in influence of terrorist organizations [31]. Moreover, as the analysis of other issues in US 
foreign policy confirms [32, p. 121], the increasing rivalry with other powerful interna-
tional actors, like Russia and China, is likely to require the United States to be even more 
assertive.
During the electoral campaign, Donald Trump portrayed the mission in Afghanistan 
as unnecessary, but once in office he had to announce an increase in US military presence. 
He also called on allies and partners to support Washington’s efforts by deploying more 
troops as a part of Resolute Support Mission. The initial reaction of allies was somewhat 
mixed. Some states like Spain, Norway and Lithuania confirmed their resolve to assist the 
United States, while Canada almost immediately publicly refused to return its troops to 
Afghanistan. Even after the decision was taken in NATO to increase the troop level, most 
countries did not disclose how much military personnel they were going to deploy. In 
August 2017, Trump presented his administration’s strategy in Afghanistan, whose main 
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pillars were conditions-based approach rather than a time-based one, “the integration of 
all instruments of American power-diplomatic, economic, and military” [33], exerting 
diplomatic pressure on Pakistan. 
A year after outlining the new strategy, the expert assessments of its progress are 
mixed [34], and US media remains highly critical [35; 36]. Meanwhile, the percentage of 
Afghan districts controlled and contested by the Taliban (forbidden in Russia) increased 
to 60 percent, according to the American Long War Journal [37]. 
3. NATO’s Increased Contribution
I demonstrate recent individual allied contributions to the North Atlantic Alliance’s 
efforts in Afghanistan — as of December 2018 — in the table below. All data is retrieved 
from the official NATO’s website, since it somewhat better depicts the situation on the 
ground and tends to be more convenient for making comparisons than individual an-
nouncements by member states. It can be slightly different to the data provided to other 
institutions, like Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, but in their bargaining 
process allied states are more likely to use the alliance’s data and indicators. I analyze and 
discuss below the information from the table.
The analysis of the table above suggests that the United States is more than any other 
state responsible for increase in the RSM troop number, deploying extra 1534 military 
personnel. However, their share as a percentage of the whole number of the RSM person-
nel even decreased to 50 percent, though in February 2017 the Americans made up ap-
proximately 52 per cent of the mission’s personnel. 
By December 2018, according to NATO’s official information, 24 out of 29 allies, in-
cluding the United States, augmented their personnel for the RSM, though their contribu-
tions differ in numbers and scale. Most of them, like Poland, presented this decision as 
resulting from the obvious need to make a fair share in collective efforts, as most other 
allied states did, and stressed that the RSM was a non-combat mission [44]. 
Canada and France who don’t deploy troops in Afghanistan did not change their 
initial decisions, largely contributing to international counter-terrorist efforts in Syria and 
Iraq. The numbers of personnel deployed in Afghanistan by Italy, Turkey and Slovak Re-
public — the latter’s contribution is relatively low — even dropped in comparison to those 
of the February 2017. 
There are some operational partners who currently deploy more troops than individ-
ual allies. Georgia who stationed 870 soldiers in Afghanistan and Australia with 300 mili-
tary personnel currently in the country are the most notable examples. Still, contributions 
by Armenia (121), Azerbaijan (120) and Mongolia (233) are also worth mentioning [40]. 
The table above clearly shows that the choice whether to augment troops or not did 
not depend on whether the state had already met the targets of the Wales summit declara-
tion or not. The progress in this sphere also did not play a significant part in this decision. 
One can see that states who already can boast their defence expenditures superseding 
2 per cent of the GDP augmented their personnel for the RSM. At the same time, all five 
states who failed to do so by this time spend for defense less than pledged in the Wales 
summit declaration. 
The United Kingdom made a spectacular move. Prior the Alliance’s summit in Brus-
sels in July 2018, it pledged to send 440 soldiers in addition to those who were earlier 
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NATO in Afghanistan (2018): Individual Contributions by Countries
Resolute 
Support 
Mission 
(February 
2017)
Resolute 
Support 
Mission 
(December 
2018)
ANA Trust 
Fund 2016
ANA Trust 
Fund 2018
Defense 
Spending as a 
Share of GDP 
(%),
Estimates for 
2018*
Expected 
progress 
(2014–
2018)*, % 
to GDP
United States 6,941 8,475 +1,534 40.369.000 3,50 –0,27 
Other Framework Nations
Germany 980 1,300 +320 448.159.000 630.000.000 1,24 +0,06
Italy 1,037 895 –142 98.156.000 345.528.000 1,15 +0,07
Turkey 558 501 –57 35.983.000 65.983.000 1,68 +0,23
Other NATO Europe 
Greece 4 10 +6 2,27 +0,06
Estonia 4 39 +35 1.098.000 1.498.000 2,14 +0,18
United Kingdom 500 1,100 +600 8.811.000 65.137.000 2,10 –0,07
Latvia 22 40 +18 1.000.000 2.000.000 2,00 +0,06
Poland 192 315 +123 1,98 +0,13
Lithuania 21 50 +29 1.052.000 2.052.000 1,96 +1,12
Romania 588 693 +105 1.471.000 1,93 +0,58
Norway 42 55 +13 77.507.000 102.250.000 1,61 +0,10
Montenegro 18 29 +11 400.000 1.600.000 1,58 +0,08
Bulgaria 86 159 +73 714.000 1.214.000 1,56 +0,24
Portugal 10 193 +183 2.262.000 4.581.000 1,36 +0,05
Netherlands 100 160 +60 103.879.000 120.8.000 1,35 +0,20
Croatia 94 106 +12 1,30 –0,10
Denmark 97 155 +58 24.180.000 30.574.000 1,21 +0,06
Slovak Republic 40 36 –4 1.000.000 2.500.000 1,20 +0,21
Albania 83 136 +53 1,19 –0,16
Czech Republic 216 364 +148 1.283.000 2.581.000 1,11 +0,16
Hungary 90 93 +3 800.000 1.700.000 1,08 +0,22
Slovenia 7 8 +1 807.000 2.557.000 1,01 +0,04
Spain 8 60 +52 5.427.000 5.427.000 0.93 +0,01
Belgium 62 82 +20 30.282.000 54.461.000 0,93 –0,05
Luxembourg 1 2 +1 35,369,000 44.682.000 0,55 +0,17
Iceland 2 3 +1
Nations Not Contributing Personnel for the RSM 
Canada 22,035,000 212.959.000 1,23 +0,22
France 1,81 –0,01
S o u r c e s : [38–43].
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 1 49
deployed there [45] by the end of the year. As in December 2018, according to the infor-
mation on official NATO’s website it deployed additional 600 troops. 
While most European states seem to be international actors with regional or at best 
transregional interests (lying in adjacent regions), post-Brexit referendum UK portrayed 
itself as ‘Global Britain’ committed “to the peace and prosperity of the world” [46]. For-
mer UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson (2016–2018) and Prime Minister Theresa May 
promoted the concept of ‘Global Britain’. Increased UK contribution to the RSM also dem-
onstrated high significance the United Kingdom attached to its ‘special relations’ with 
Washington and its commitment to NATO. 
“In committing additional troops to the Train Advise and Assist operation in Af-
ghanistan we have underlined once again that when NATO calls the UK is among the 
first to answer” [47], declared British Prime Minister Theresa May. At the times, when the 
UK’s relations with the European Union are strained in the course of long and painstaking 
Brexit, it pledges its allegiance to NATO as important multilateral institution that unites 
Britain with the United States and most European countries, as May did in the Alliance’s 
headquarters during the July 2018 summit. “NATO is vital today as it ever has been and 
our commitment to it remains steadfast. The Alliance can rely on the UK to lead by exam-
ple” [47], May said. While having some budgetary problems, Britain is still likely to spend 
more than 2 per cent GDP for defense, according to NATO estimates, and as Theresa may 
claims, it still intends to lead NATO by the power of its example. 
UK Ambassador in Afghanistan Sir Nicholas Kay, who was recently appointed as NA-
TO’s next Senior Civilian Representative there, in August 2018 had claimed that Trump’s 
strategy for the country “was working” [48]. Still, the Government’s decision to augment 
the personnel for the RSM met some criticism in media. The move was depicted as hav-
ing to do nothing with British security, the troops were just a “present to Trump” in order 
to “appease’ him, while the economic situation required from the UK more strategic re-
straint [49]. 
Germany, Europe’s wealthiest economy was one of the largest contributors to the 
RSM and ANA Trust Fund and one of the four NATO ‘framework nations’ in Afghani-
stan, is leading a regional Train, Advise, and Assist Command responsible for coordinat-
ing support and capabilities within its respective command region. It became an object of 
Trump’s sharp criticism for failing to meet 2 per cent target. German government chose to 
send extra 320 troops to Afghanistan, making its contingent one of the largest — 1300 — 
up to date and channel more funds to ANA Trust Fund. This choice testifies for Germany’s 
high economic potential as well as the significance it attaches for cooperation in NATO 
despite publicly displayed tensions with the United States. 
Back in 1975, the Federal Republic of Germany’s defense expenditure amounted up 
to 3,13 per cent of GDP. Now, to some commentators, it seems lacking strategy and resolve 
to boost up its military capabilities [50]. Still, present day Germany wants to assume more 
responsibility in regional and global scale. At least, Federal Government’s Report to the 
German Bundestag of February 2018 clearly testifies that its approach to engagement in 
Afghanistan is based on these considerations [51]. It states, that “Germany is committed 
to the responsibility it took on for the people in Afghanistan, its undertakings to interna-
tional partners and solidarity among NATO allies” [51, p. 6]. Germany adheres itself to 
multilateral comprehensive civil-military approach without rigid deadlines that would en-
sure that Afghanistan’s sufficient stability and that it would not “pose a threat to Germany, 
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its allies and the region” [51, p. 6]. German government links its prolonged engagement 
with Afghanistan with the task to reduce the causes for migration. 
Germany’s stated goals of joint engagement are broad. They include reducing the vio-
lent conflict, creating legitimate and stable state in Afghanistan, ensuring economic and 
social development, fostering an Afghan-owned peace process that is supported by other 
countries in the region [51, p. 7]. Germany calls for “strategic patience” in order to give 
Afghan government time to become effective. Critics claim that Germany’s mission in the 
country remains vague and its desired outcomes cannot be achieved in foreseeable future 
[52]. German Green party also shares the view that the operation in Afghanistan can be 
endless. 
On the military side, the aforementioned report of the German government claimed 
that as a framework nation Germany should be “flexible, so that it could fill capability 
shortfalls that might arise among its multinational partners in the North” [51, p. 12] and 
that it “had no military assets at its disposal to react to unexpected situations that might 
arise” [51, p. 12]. An expected decision to send more troops to Afghanistan came amid the 
criticism of the German military for being able to carry out only about a half of its joint 
operations with the Afghan army in winter 2018 [53]. 
As in summer 2018, Italy had about 5000 troops on foreign deployment worldwide, 
much more than some other European NATO states like Germany (3  800) and Spain 
(1700) [54]. Extensive participation in military operations is viewed by some as a means 
to maintain and even increase Italy’s role [54] in international arena and among US Eu-
ropean allies in particular. The former cabinet of Paolo Gentilone did not object to the 
American requirement to increase defense spending but played for time without making 
significant decisions in this sphere. In its political rhetoric it referred to multiple mili-
tary operations where Italy participates, including that in Afghanistan, that should be also 
counted as the country’s contribution to collective efforts [55]. 
During the run-up to the parliamentary elections in Italy in 2018, the leader of the 
populist Five-Star Movement (M5S) Luigi Di Maio stated that Italy should pull out of the 
NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, as it exposed Italian soldiers “to point-
less risks” [56]. After winning relative success in elections and making a ruling coalition 
with Lega Nord in March 2018, M5S took a more traditional approach to its NATO policy. 
Though the possibility of Italy’s reduction of its RSM personnel still exists, it launched an 
air policing mission in Montenegro alongside with Greece. 
Even more important than populist rhetoric of M5S for Italy is its strategic consider-
ations. It finds itself a ‘frontline state’ on NATO’s Southern Flank lying on the crossroads 
of major migrant routes and exposed to the threats of political instability in Africa and 
the Middle East. Its commitment to NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan can be further 
compromised by its interests and immediate threats in the neighboring regions. Currently 
Italy also prepares for a new mission in Niger to counter human trafficking. 
The other RSM framework nation — Turkey — not only faces immediate threats of 
civil war in neighboring Syria and rising influence of Kurdish community, it also wants to 
play a more assertive role as NATO’s largest nation with predominantly Muslim popula-
tion. These two conflicting incentives are likely to influence Ankara’s policy in Afghanistan. 
As previously mentioned, the RSM is NATO’s non-combat mission, and the number 
of international troops currently stationed in Afghanistan is considerably lower than be-
fore the end of 2014. The high influence of the Taliban (forbidden in Russia) in the coun-
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try as well as the activity of other terrorist groups, including the ISIL-KP (forbidden in 
Russia), and illicit trade in drugs remain sources of concern. However, for many member 
states, the conflict in Afghanistan is a remote mostly “American war”, while now they face 
crucial challenges of terrorism and uncontrolled migration emanating from the adjacent 
regions of Africa and Middle East. Still, the perceptions about the scales of those threats 
differ considerably depending on what region of Europe is concerned. Earlier experiences 
with unpopular combat mission in Afghanistan, causing casualties and growing expenses 
also influence European attitudes. 
A decision to augment, at least symbolically, their military presence in Afghanistan is 
a face-saving gesture in a hope to increase to some extent its bargaining power in dealing 
with the United States, while facing sharp criticism of Donald Trump. 
Though Spain’s contribution of troops to the RSM is low in comparison to those of 
other member states and operational partners, former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy 
(2011–2018) of People’s Party was one of the first foreign leaders who responded Trump’s 
call to increase military presence [57]. The government of Rajoy anchored its hopes on 
closer relations with Washington and even aspired a role of intermediary between the 
United States and the EU after Brexit. Even more important, Rajoy wanted to contrast 
himself to the former Socialist Workers’ Party government of José Luis Rodríguez Za-
patero (2004–2011) who pulled Spanish troops from Iraq and reportedly missed many 
opportunities in relationship with Washington. Thus, there were hopes to use cooperative 
behavior in NATO as a clout in domestic politics as well. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, success or failure to meet NATO guidelines on defense 
expenditure does not seem to be a decisive factor defining the significant increase in con-
tributions to the Alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan. There are cases when allies with low in-
dicators just symbolically increased their presence (Hungary, Slovenia) or even decreased 
it (Slovak Republic, Italy). At the same time, states who met the goal of 2 per cent or al-
most met it, noticeably built up their presence (UK, Poland and Romania). 
In some instances, the hypothesis finds some empirical support. The contribution of 
Greece, whose military expenditures amount to 2, 27 per cent of its GDP, to the RSM is 
relatively low according to the information on NATO official website. However, in June 
2018, the Hellenic Air Force sent a team of technical advisers to Afghanistan to display the 
commitment of Athens to allied efforts [58]. 
Russian prominent diplomat and researcher Yevgeniy M. Primakov claimed that one 
of the reasons of NATO enlargement was “strengthening of intra-bloc discipline” [59] 
by inclusion new members, more loyal to Washington than the old ones. Later research 
on countries’ of the ‘new Europe’ participation in military operations of North Atlan-
tic Alliance deriving empirics from NATO’s intervention to Libya in 2011, demonstrated 
that Central and Eastern European nations were more eager to participate in missions in 
which Washington was particularly interested and played prominent role [60, p. 360–362]. 
The case of recent NATO military buildup in Afghanistan that I consider in this arti-
cle suggests that states of ‘new Europe’ tend to demonstrate loyalty to Washington, though 
contributions of some of them to RSM and ANA Trust Fund are very small in comparison 
to those of other allies, as in case of Hungary, Slovenia, Montenegro, Slovak Republic. 
However, the cases of Romania, Poland and Baltic states are more complicated. Those 
states increased their contributions to the RSM, while they could probably avoid it refer-
ring to the threat of Russia. 
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As for the states of the ‘old Europe’, their contribution in Afghanistan seems to be 
more significant. All ‘framework nations’ providing most troops for the RSM, except for 
the United States, belong to ‘old Europe’ (Germany, Italy, Turkey). Europe’s larger and 
wealthier economies more often than not belong to this group as well. They channel sig-
nificantly larger funds to ANA Trust Fund. However, when it comes to troop numbers, 
one should place Georgia and Romania along the aforementioned ‘framework nations’ 
to the list of the largest contributors. And, of, course, allies may provide some auxiliary 
support that I do not analyze here, like, for example, Slovak Republic, who organized the 
training of Afghani helicopter pilots in its facilities in Košice [61]. 
The cases of states who do not participate in collective efforts in Afghanistan or re-
cently decreased their contributions are also worth consideration. Canada, who has “no 
plans” to double its defence budget, according to her Prime Minister Justin Trudeau [62], 
refrained from returning its troops to Afghanistan, which they left in March 2014. It is 
Canadian prime minister who claims that meeting a 2 per cent target is a wrong indicator 
of ally’s commitment and that one has to assess state’s participation in combat missions. 
Though absent from Afghanistan, Canada focuses on other important NATO operations. 
Recently it increased military deployment in Latvia up to 540 troops and extended its mis-
sion through another four years. It will also run NATO’s training mission in Iraq. 
France positions itself in the North Atlantic Alliance as ‘steadfast but independent 
ally’ [63], strongly committed to the fight against terrorism. After signing a friendship 
and cooperation treaty with Afghanistan on 27 January 2012, France stresses its predomi-
nantly civilian role in the stabilization of the country [64]. French President Emmanuel 
Macron endorsed Trump’s new strategy in Afghanistan, but Paris still refrains from par-
ticipation in the RSM. France acts outside the Alliance framework and focuses on fighting 
terrorism in the Middle East and bringing stability to Africa. 
An in-depth research on the French experience with Afghanistan demonstrates that 
“the French government never really tried to develop a coherent and consistent strategic 
narrative to convince the public about the necessity to intervene in Afghanistan. The pur-
pose of the French deployment and the prospect of success were never directly exposed” 
[65; p. 124]. Ronald Hatto describes the reaction of the French public to the Afghan war as 
benign neglect, absent profound domestic discussion, until Nicolas Sarkozy’s government 
decided to augment the French presence there in 2008  [65, p. 125]. However, then the 
valuable time to explain to the public the goals of the deployment was lost, and powerful 
critical narratives appeared in mass media. 
The same criticism widely remained in French media accounts of the events in Af-
ghanistan and efforts by the United States, its allies and partners, when Donald Trump 
unveiled his strategy. They mentioned that the reason behind the US president revised his 
approach to Afghanistan was ousting from Trump’s administration his key strategist and 
ideologist Stephen K. Bannon, who advocated lessening of the US global role, and also 
growing influence of the ‘generals’ in the White House — namely Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis, National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster, White House Chief of Staff John 
Kelly [66]. The same editorial in “Le monde” described the war in Afghanistan as “a war 
of attrition, distant, difficult and ungrateful, which has already cost the lives of more than 
2,000 Americans and thousands of Afghans” [66]. The same criticism and pessimistic ac-
counts of the situation in Afghanistan were quite common for Canadian media coverage. 
One piece of text is even worth citation, since it went so far as to saying that the Afghans 
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questioned real intentions of the West. “Many Afghans, including Karzai, are convinced 
that the United States and NATO have the military ability to defeat the Taliban (forbidden 
in Russia). But with the war raging 16 years after the Taliban were ousted, they accuse the 
West of seemingly wanting chaos over peace” [67].
When Donald Trump unveiled his strategy for Afghanistan there were many doubts 
in the United States as well whether it would work. Sending more troops there without 
clear deadlines intended to exert additional pressure on the Taliban (forbidden in Russia) 
and Pakistan who supports it. However, the discussion on whether the US should focus 
more on counter-terrorism measures or negotiate peaceful settlement with the Taliban 
without sending extra troops continued [68]. This perceived lack of clear strategy how to 
end up the conflict coupled with Trump’s tardiness in presenting his admiration’s policy 
further complicated the mobilization of public support for collective efforts in Afghani-
stan in all NATO states. 
Conclusions
In the context of increased competition in international arena, the goals of consoli-
dating and strengthening NATO as well as bringing its current mission in Afghanistan to 
successful termination gains even more significance in practical terms. It is also a means 
to sustain the solid reputation of the United States as a powerful international actor. 
I checked the hypothesis that facing sharp criticism from the United States president 
for free riding in NATO, those members who fail to meet the target of 2 per cent of GDP 
in their defense expenditure would choose to increase significantly their contributions to 
the Alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan. I did not find enough convincing empirical data to 
prove this hypothesis. Official information on increased contributions of member states 
provided a somewhat mixed picture. Those contributions rather reflect the power poten-
tials of member states and ambitions they pursue by cooperating in NATO framework. 
The pressure of the United States on its allies remains high in the considered period 
of Trump presidency. Generally, US allies seem to retain some interest in preserving the 
Alliance. At the same time, they remain able to define the scale of their contribution to 
collective efforts in NATO framework. The considerable broadening of the Alliance’s pur-
view after the end of the Cold war provides member states with additional alternatives 
for choosing the types of their involvement. Given the possibility for its numerous allies 
to choose in what missions they want to participate side by side with Washington — in 
NATO framework as well as beyond it — the latter finds it relatively easy to form coali-
tions and maintain consensus among its partners. Still, progressing inclination of NATO 
states to opt for missions beyond the Alliance’s framework can undermine its effectiveness 
and global role. 
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